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COMMENT
CIVIL RIGHTS - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - THE
ACTIONABILITY OF A NEGLIGENT
DEPRIVATION OF A LIBERTY
INTEREST IN LIGHT OF DANIELS
AND DAVIDSON
INTRODUCTION
On occasion, an official1 acting under color of state law2
deprives an individual of a liberty interest 3 without due pro-
1. Officials include, but are not limited to, police officers, deputy sheriffs, school
boards, teachers and prison officials.
2. For a plaintiff to state a section 1983 cause of action, the deprivation of a consti-
tutional right must have been caused by state action. This requirement comes from two
sources: 1) 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which has as one of its elements acting "under color
of state law," and 2) the state action language of the fourteenth amendment. See S.
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, A GUIDE TO § 1983 38
(1979).
3. This Comment is limited only to deprivations of liberty. To precisely define a
"liberty" interest is rather difficult, but it is this concept that is the primary limitation
on the states with respect to individual rights. N. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 533 (1983) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK]; see generally
Monaghan, Of Liberty and Property, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1977). Judicial inter-
pretation has given the word "liberty" a very expansive definition, so much so that it
has been said that it embraces every form and aspect of individual rights that are not
necessarily taken away by some valid law for the common good. 16A AM. JUR. 2D
Constitutional Law § 553 (1979) (citing Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 330, 75 N.E. 404
(1905), overruled, Klein v. Maraveas, 219 N.Y. 383, 114 N.E. 809 (1916)); see also
National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) ("Great concepts like... liberty... were purposely left to gather
meaning from experience.").
In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), the Court offered this discussion of
"liberty":
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty... guar-
anteed, the term has received much consideration, and some of the included
things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized...
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness.
Thus, "liberty" which is protected by the due process clause does not merely denote
an individual's freedom from physical or bodily restraint, but also includes liberty of the
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cess of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution.4 To redress such a deprivation,
one may commence an action under 42 United States Code
section 1983.- This statute was enacted by Congress to pro-
tect certain rights "secured by the constitution and laws"
mind as well as liberty of action. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled
on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793 (1969).
Prior to Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986) and Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S.
Ct. 668 (1986), it was thought that negligence could implicate a person's liberty interest.
The court of appeals in Daniels held that bodily injury resulting from a state official's
negligence deprives a person of a liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 795 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 662
(1986).
A further attempt at explaining "liberty" was made by the Court in Board of Re-
gents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In that case, the Court broadly defined "liberty" as
not only freedom from bodily restraint, but also, freedom "to enjoy those privileges long
recognized... as essential to orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id. at 572.
Historically, "liberty" includes the right to be free from "unjustified intrusions on
personal security." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977).
In Ingraham, children claimed that they were deprived of liberty without due pro-
cess of law. They claimed that they had been spanked without due process or some type
of hearing. The Court agreed that corporal punishment, in the form of a spanking,
implicated students' interest in liberty, but held that prior notice and a hearing were not
necessary if later post-deprivation remedies were adequate. There is no indication that
the Court decided this way because it felt that educators needed to maintain discipline
in the schools. Id. at 672-76.
In the police misconduct context, the police usually infringe on an individual's lib-
erty interest by restraining and/or inflicting harm on that person. Although the Court
in Ingraham suggested that there is a de minimis level of imposition with which the
Constitution is not concerned, "liberty" interests are otherwise implicated whenever
state authorities bodily restrain or punish an individual. Id. at 674. It is, therefore,
possible that bodily injuries resulting from a police officer's negligence could deprive a
person of a liberty interest. However, a deprivation of a liberty interest alone is insuffi-
cient to afford protection under the fourteenth amendment. To have a fourteenth
amendment violation, one has to be deprived of a liberty interest without due process of
law. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
4. The fourteenth amendment's due process clause reads: "[Nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law .... U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981 & Supp. V 1985)). The statute reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. [hereinafter 42 U.S.C. § 1983 shall be referred to as section 1983].
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against infringement by the states.6 Under the proper facts,
section 1983 can be used to provide the plaintiff with a
number of very significant advantages7 vis-a-vis police depart-
ments, municipalities8 and "others acting under color of state
law."9
Usually, a deprivation of a liberty interest without due
process occurs as a result of an intentional act. In some in-
stances, however, a negligent 0 act could result in a depriva-
tion of a fourteenth amendment liberty interest.11 Prior to the
United States Supreme Court case of Parratt v. Taylor,12 the
question of whether negligence was actionable under section
1983 had been an issue of much debate in the lower federal
courts.13 Although Parratt settled the controversy to some ex-
tent by stating that negligence was actionable, it raised new
discord by holding that if there was an available state tort
remedy, then a negligent deprivation of a property interest
would not be actionable under section 1983.14 In other words,
the Court in Parratt used a due process analysis to preclude
6. S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 2. This work is highly recommended for any per-
son involved in section 1983 litigation.
7. See Gleisner, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983-Federal Civil Rights as a Tool of the State
Personal Injury Litigator, CR-2, presented at the Winter Seminar of the Wisconsin
Academy of Trial Lawyers (Dec. 7, 1984). Such advantages include avoiding the no-
tice of injury, notice of claim, and damage limitation contained in Wis. STAT. § 893.80
(1983-84). Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Thompson v. Village of Hales
Comers, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 340 N.W.2d 704 (1983). Section 1983 can also be used to
circumvent certain statutes of limitations for survival statutes and wrongful death stat-
utes. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978); Blake v. Katter, 693 F.2d 677 (7th
Cir. 1982). Additionally, in the proper situation, section 1983 gives the plaintiff a
choice of a state forum or a federal forum. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980),
overruled, Pernhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Martinez
v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d 475, 254 N.W.2d 704
(1977).
8. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
9. See supra note 2. The term "acting under color of state law" has caused numer-
ous interpretational problems which are beyond the scope of this Comment.
10. RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) provides the following defini-
tion: "In the Restatement of this Subject, negligence is conduct which falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm. It does not include conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others." See
generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS §§ 29-34 (5th ed. 1984).
11. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
12. 451 U.S. 527 (1981); see infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs from seeking redress under section 1983 for the neg-
ligent deprivation of a property interest.
Recently, the Court in Daniels v. Williams 15 and Davidson
v. Cannon 16 set aside the Parratt analysis with respect to negli-
gence and held that negligent acts of state officials are not due
process violations. The Court in Daniels and Davidson over-
ruled Parratt to the extent that the mere lack of due care by a
state official may no longer "deprive" an individual of life, lib-
erty, or property under the fourteenth amendment. 17 Presum-
ably, however, the Parratt analysis still survives for non-
negligent acts.
After Parratt and prior to Daniels and Davidson, the
Supreme Court and a number of lower courts expanded the
scope of the Parratt analysis. The Court in Hudson v. Palmer
extended the Parratt analysis to include intentional depriva-
tions of property.18 Further, the Parratt analysis was ex-
tended to include negligent 19 and intentional20 deprivations of
liberty. By doing so, those courts effectively precluded plain-
tiffs from seeking redress in the federal courts under section
1983 for liberty deprivations whenever a state action sounding
in tort existed. This phenomenon should be examined in light
of the Court's decisions in Daniels and Davidson.
The scope of this Comment is limited to the issue of
whether a negligent deprivation of a liberty interest is actiona-
ble under section 1983. Because of the complexity of this is-
sue, a brief history of section 1983 is necessary. Part I deals
with a history of section 1983, focusing primarily on negligent
conduct. Further, Part I looks at the Parratt decision. Part II
examines the Daniels and Davidson decisions. Part III ex-
plains the two types of due process - substantive due process
and procedural due process and discusses the effect of Parratt,
15. 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
16. 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
17. Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 664-65.
18. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3204 (1984), the Court extended the analy-
sis to include an intentional deprivation of property. Thus, the availability of a state
tort remedy providing for recovery in intentional deprivation of property cases pre-
cludes recovery under section 1983.
19. See infra note 79 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740
F.2d 329, 337-38 (5th Cir. 1984).
20. See infra note 79 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Gamier v. Szentmiklosi, 565
F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
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Daniels and Davidson on both of these types of due process.
Finally, Part IV offers an analysis and recommendation con-
cerning why a negligently deprived liberty interest which rises
to a substantive due process violation should be considered a
constitutional violation and therefore actionable under section
1983. With respect to procedural due process violations of a
liberty interest, this Comment proposes that gross negligence
be the minimum degree of culpability required to maintain an
action under section 1983.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF SECTION 1983 AND ITS
APPLICATION TO NEGLIGENT ACTS
A. Legislative History
In the South after the Civil War, atrocities committed
against white republicans and blacks were numerous and
widespread. 21 A number of groups were responsible, the Ku
Klux Klan being the most notable among them.22 As a result,
President Grant sent a message to the 42nd Congress request-
ing the enactment of legislation to curb this deplorable state of
affairs.23 Congress responded by passing the Civil Rights Act
21. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871) [hereinafter cited as GLOBE].
For a good legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and section 1 of this Act,
referred to as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983), see J. CooK & J.
SOBIESKI, CIVIL RIGHTS AcTION ch. 11 (1983) [hereinafter referred to as COOK];
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-87 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, Monell v. New
York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1977); see also Comment, Action-
ability of Negligence Under § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 533,
541-44 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as Actionability of Negligence]; Comment, The
Supreme Court Continues Its Journey Down the Ever Narrowing Paths of Section 1983
and the Due Process Clause: An Analysis of Parratt v. Taylor, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
579, 581 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Supreme Court Journey].
22. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 443-44. Representative Butler made reference to the
"Invisible Empire," the "Knights of the White Camelia," the "Heroes of America," the
"Red Strings," the "White Brotherhood," and the "Constitutional Union Guards."
23. The message of March 23, 1871, stated:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering life and
property insecure .... That the power to correct these evils is beyond the
control of State authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the Executive of the
United States, acting within the limits of existing laws is sufficient for present
emergencies is not clear. Therefore, I urgently recommend such legislation as in
the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and
the enforcement of law in all parts of the United States.
See GLOBE, supra note 21, at 244.
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of 1871.24 Section 1 was commonly referred to as the Ku
Klux Klan Act .2  The primary purpose of the Act was to en-
24. A notable proponent of the legislation was Representative Samuel Shellaburger,
a Republican from Ohio, who chaired a select committee which received President
Grant's message of March 23, 1871. Rep. Shellaburger stated that there could be no
doubt of the right of Congress to enact the proposed legislation:
And how can there be a doubt about a question like that? To say in our Consti-
tution that all our people in the States shall be United States citizens, and also
citizens of the States; to add this as a curative, new and additional part of the
instrument, and in it to say that State laws shall not be made or enforced to
abridge the rights or not be made or enforced to abridge these rights of United
States citizens nor the States deny protection of these rights under law, and that
Congress may enforce these provisions securing these rights, and then to say that
Congress can do no such thing as make any law so enforcing these rights, nor
open the United States courts to enforce any such laws, but must leave all the
protection and law-making to the very States which are denying the protection,
is plainly and grossly absurd.
GLOBE, supra note 21, at app. 68.
There was also vociferous opposition to the bill. Representative Michael Kerr of
Indiana was one of the most staunch opponents. His criticism is as follows:
This section gives to any person who may have been injured in any of his rights,
privileges, or immunities of person or property, a civil action for damages
against the wrongdoer in the Federal courts. The offense committed against him
may be the common violations of the municipal law of his State. It may give rise
to numerous vexatious and outrageous prosecutions, inspired by mere mercenary
considerations, prosecuted in a spirit of plunder, aided by the crimes of perjury
and subornation of perjury, more reckless and dangerous to society than the
alleged offenses out of which the cause of action may have arisen. It is a covert
attempt to transfer another large portion of jurisdiction from the State tribunals,
to which it of right belongs, to those of the United States. It is neither author-
ized nor expedient, and is not calculated to bring peace, or order, or domestic
content or prosperity to the disturbed society of the South. The contrary will
certainly be its effect.
GLOBE, supra note 21, at app. 50; see also Cook, supra note 21 at 1-318.
25. The Act states:
Forty-Second Congress, Sess. I Ch. 22, 1871.
Chps. XXII
An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and for Other Purposes
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That any person who, under color of any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject,
or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution of the United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
customs, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the
party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts
of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appearance, review
upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the
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force the fourteenth amendment through the imposition of
civil liability.26 Although one target of the Act was the Ku
Klux Klan, its principle focus was against those who repre-
sented the state in some capacity and who were unable or re-
fused to enforce state laws.27
With respect to the level of culpability required, no stan-
dards were set forth in the Act.28  From the speeches of the
legislators, there is some indication that the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 provided a remedy for negligent as well as intentional
deprivations of constitutional liberties.29 The legislative his-
tory demonstrates that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was in-
tended to be a far-reaching remedy which was designed to
provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, enti-
tled 'An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to
furnish the means of their vindication'; and the other remedial laws of the
United States which are in their nature applicable in such cases.
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
1983 (1981 & Supp. V 1985)).
26. See Actionability of Negligence, supra note 21, at 537; see also Monroe, 365 U.S.
at 173-74. The Supreme Court in Monroe elucidated three purposes of the Ku Klux
Klan Act. The first purpose was to "override certain kinds of state laws." Second, it
was to provide a remedy where a state law was inadequate. The third aim, which was
much broader, was to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though ade-
quate in theory, was not available in practice. Id.
27. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 175-76; Actionability of Negligence, supra note 21, at 540.
28. Actionability of Negligence, supra note 21, at 540-41.
29. Id. at 543. Representative Arthur noted that law enforcement officials could
be held liable "for a mere error in judgment," although they were "as pure in duty as a
saint and seraph." GLOBE, supra note 21, at 365. Further, Senator Thurman, one of the
most vociferous opponents of the bill, cautioned:
It authorizes any person who is deprived of any rights, privilege, or immunity
secured to him by the Constitution of the United States, to bring an action
against the wrongdoer in the Federal courts, and that without any limit whatso-
ever as to the amount in controversy. The deprivation may be of the slightest
conceivable character, the damages in the estimation of any sensible man may not
be five dollars or even five cents; they may be what lawyers call merely nominal
damages; and yet by this section jurisdiction of that civil action is given to the
Federal courts.
Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1960), Justice Douglas stated, after an exhaustive
study of the legislative history:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a
federal right in federal courts, because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect,
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of
citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.
Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
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encompass acts or omissions resulting in constitutional depri-
vations, including negligent acts °.3  However, in the years af-
ter the enactment of the statute, the Supreme Court was quick
to limit the application of the Act.31 Eventually, the Court32
excluded civil rights cases from actionability under the Civil
Rights Act of 187 1.33 As a result, the statute lay dormant for
nearly ninety years.
B. Section 1983 and the Actionability of Negligence
Prior to Parratt
In 1961, a new breath of life was given to section 1983.34
In Monroe v. Pape,35 the Supreme Court held that Congress
had intended in 1871 to create a remedy for persons deprived
of their constitutional rights by an official's abuse of power.36
30. Actionability of Negligence, supra note 21, at 544.
31. Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 1133, 1156-57 (1977).
32. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
33. Note, supra note 31, at 1157; cf. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). Plaintiffs
seeking redress under section 1983 were sometimes successful; however, these cases
were limited to vindicating the deprivation of voting rights. See also Barnier v.
Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
34. For a good judicial history of section 1983 prior to Monroe v. Pape, see Shapo,
Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277,
282-94 (1965).
35. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Social Serv., 658 U.S. 663 (1977). The facts of Monroe v. Pape are as follows:
The petitioners, a black family of eight people, were sleeping in their house when 13
City of Chicago police officers broke into the home without any warrant for search or
arrest. The police officers routed the family from bed and made them stand naked in
the living room. While the family was standing naked, the police officers ransacked
every room, emptying drawers and ripping mattress covers. Then the father was taken
to the police station and detained on "open" charges for 10 hours while he was interro-
gated about a murder that occurred two days earlier. During this 10-hour period, the
father was not taken before a magistrate, though one was available. Furthermore, he
was not permitted to call his family or his attorney. Finally, he was released without
any criminal charges being filed against him.
The father and his family brought an action against the Chicago Police Department
claiming that the invasion of their home and the detention of the father without a war-
rant constituted a deprivation of their civil rights. Id. at 168-70. "The City of Chicago
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was not liable under the Civil
Rights Act nor for acts committed in performance of its governmental function." Id. at
170.
The Court ruled that the officials who perpetrated the deprivation could be liable
under section 1983; however, the Court held that Congress did not intend to bring
municipal corporations within the sphere of section 1983. Id. at 187.
36. Id. at 172.
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After a thorough study of the legislative history, Justice
Douglas indicated that one reason the legislation was passed
was to afford a remedy in federal court, without which, due to
prejudice, passion, neglect or otherwise, state laws may not be
enforced and the enjoyment of rights guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment may be denied. Furthermore, the Court
refused to interpret a specific intent requirement into section
1983.38 Indeed, the Court stated that "[section 1983] should
be read against the background of tort liability that makes a
man responsible for the natural consequences of his ac-
tions. ' 39 This language in Monroe, implying that negligence
could be actionable under section 1983, caused much disa-
greement in the lower federal courts.4°
37. Id. at 180.
38. Id. at 187.
39. Id. Additionally, the Court rejected the proposition that state remedies must be
exhausted before recovery is allowed under section 1983. Specifically, the Court
indicated:
It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The
federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be
first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked. Hence the fact that
Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures
is no barrier to the present suit in the federal court.
Id. at 183. It should be noted that this decision was not unanimous; Justice Frankfurter
dissented. The thrust of Frankfurter's dissent was that the Court should be careful
about applying the Civil Rights Act to dubious new issues. Id. at 244.
40. The Circuits that generally hold negligence to be actionable: FIFTH CIR-
CUIT: Fox v. Sullivan, 539 F.2d 1065, 1065-66 (5th Cir. 1976); Sims v. Adams, 537
F.2d 829, 832 (5th Cir. 1976); Parker v. McKeithen, 488 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974); Beverly v. Morris, 470 F.2d 1356, 1357 (5th Cir. 1972);
Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819, 826 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971);
Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 788 (5th Cir. 1969) ("The Supreme Court's use of the
term 'neglect' and the expansive phrase 'or otherwise' appears to us directly contrary to
the 'improper motive' requirement." Such language suggests that a federal forum is no
less desirable for the inadvertent than for the malicious violation of constitutionally
protected rights.). SIXTH CIRCUIT: Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1077 (6th
Cir. 1972); Puckett v. Cox, 456 F.2d 233, 234 (6th Cir. 1972) ("We believe it is incorrect
as a general rule, and misleading in this particular case, to state that the negligent con-
duct of a person acting under color of state law cannot be the basis for relief under
§ 1983."). DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT: Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358,
365 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nor District of Columbia v. Carter,
409 U.S. 418 (1973).
The circuits that generally hold negligence to be actionable but on occasion have
held otherwise: SECOND CIRCUIT: Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 709
F.2d 782, 786-87 (2d Cir. 1983). But see Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 546 (2d Cir.
1974); Holmes v. Goldin, 615 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1980). THIRD CIRCUIT: Norton
v. McKeon, 444 F. Supp. 384, 387 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir.
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A number of arguments were offered by courts and com-
mentators in favor of holding negligent conduct actionable
under section 1983. By far, the most prominent argument was
1979) (third circuit affirmed a district court which held that negligence is actionable).
But see Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1972) (wrongful intention or
culpability required under section 1983). EIGHTH CIRCUIT: Taylor v. Parratt, 620
F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). But see Brown v.
United States, 486 F.2d 284, 287 (8th Cir. 1973) (dicta). NINTH CIRCUIT: Johnson
v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978) (dicta); Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d
277, 281 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Procunier v. Navarette, 434
U.S. 555 (1978). But see Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483, 485 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1016 (1969). TENTH CIRCUIT: McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693, 697
(10th Cir. 1979). But see Daniels v. Van De Venter, 382 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1967).
* The fourth circuit has on occasion held that section 1983 does not impose any culpa-
bility requirement. Once the plaintiff proves his prima facie case, he need not prove any
further culpability to prove damages. Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980); Pritchard v. Perry, 508 F.2d 423, 425 (4th Cir. 1975);
Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232-33 (4th Cir. 1970); Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d
368, 373 (4th Cir. 1974); cf. McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 5-6 (4th Cir. 1972)
(negligence is redressable under section 1983).
The first circuit has generally held negligence not to be actionable. Page v. Sharpe,
487 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1973); cf. Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585, 589
n.3 (D.R.I. 1978) (first circuit has not specifically addressed the standard of culpability
under section 1983).
The seventh circuit has repeatedly held that section 1983 requires at minimum a
reckless or intentional act. Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993, 1000 (7th Cir. 1980); White
v. Rockford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979); Beard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 494
(7th Cir. 1979); Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 568-69 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
District courts that have held negligence actionable: Watson v. McGee, 527 F.
Supp. 234, 238 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Culp v. Devlin, 437 F. Supp. 20, 22-23 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136, 151 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Aldridge
v. Mullins, 377 F. Supp. 850, 857-58 (M.D. Tenn. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1189 (6th Cir.
1973); Love v. Davis, 353 F. Supp. 587, 591 (W.D. La. 1972); Huey v. Barloga, 277 F.
Supp. 864, 870 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
District courts that have held negligence not actionable: O'Neal v. Evans, 496 F.
Supp. 867, 870 (S.D. Ga. 1980); Heard v. LaFourche Parish School Bd., 480 F. Supp.
231, 232 (E.D. La. 1979); Popow v. City of Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237, 1244 (D.N.J.
1979) (degree of culpability must exceed simple negligence and amount to gross negli-
gence); Loopman v. Hurley, 475 F. Supp. 98, 99 (D.N.H. 1979); Joyner v. McClellan,
396 F. Supp. 912, 915 (D. Md. 1975); Vun Cannon v. Breed, 391 F. Supp. 1371, 1374
(N.D. Cal. 1975); Fearon v. Virginia, 383 F. Supp. 542, 543 (W.D. Va. 1974); Newsome
v. Sielaff, 375 F. Supp. 1189, 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Reed v. Philadelphia Housing Au-
thority, 372 F. Supp. 686, 692 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Barnes v. Armour, 392 F. Supp. 1240,
1242 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Jenkins v. Meyers, 338 F. Supp. 383, 388 (N.D. Ill. 1972),
aff'd mem., 481 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1973); Jones v. McElroy, 429 F. Supp. 848, 863
(E.D. Pa. 1977); Mullins v. City of River Rouge, 338 F. Supp. 26, 29 (E.D. Mich. 1972);
Hopkins v. County of Cook, 305 F. Supp. 1011, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Kent v. Prosse,
265 F. Supp. 673, 675 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 385 F.2d 406 (3d Cir. 1967).
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that the language in Monroe41 appeared to permit liability
founded upon negligence.42 Further, language which stated
that section 1983 should be read against the background of
tort liability,43 coupled with the fact that the Court rejected
the notion that state remedies be exhausted before recovery,'
suggested that negligence was actionable.45  Another argu-
ment was that some constitutional provisions could indeed be
violated by negligence.46 If the plaintiff were injured as the
result of a violation of a constitutional provision by a state
officer, then redress of the plaintiff's injuries should not turn
on whether the state officer acted negligently or
intentionally.47
The arguments against negligence being actionable under
section 1983 were equally compelling. First, some commenta-
tors expressed a philosophical concern about the substitution
of federal for state law remedies.4 8 By injecting the federal
courts into the arena of local police, municipal, and prison
regulation, there would be an upset in the balance of authority
between the federal and state governments. 49 Further, there
41. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Puckett, 456 F.2d at 234-35; Roberts, 456 F.2d at 826; Whirl, 407 F.2d
at 787, Huey, 277 F. Supp. at 872-73.
43. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 39.
45. Note, Unauthorized Deprivations of Property Under Color of Law: 4 Critique of
the Supreme Court's Due Process Analysis in Parratt v. Taylor, and a Proposed Alterna-
tive Analysis, 36 RTrrGERs L. REV. 179, 184-85 (1983).
46. Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional Tort Under Section 1983: The State of
Mind Requirement, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 45, 64 (1977).
47. Id.
48. Note, Section 1983, Liability for Negligence, 58 NEB. L. REV. 271, 274 (1978).
49. See Shapo, supra note 34, at 324. ("The question may be turned around by
asking whether it would violate the tenth amendment if Congress passed Monroe and its
police-tort descendants as a statute. A cogent argument could be made that the punish-
ment of police offenses clearly is reserved to the states."). But see Note, Civil Rights -
Personal Injury - Intent to Injure Is Not a Prerequisite to Recovery for Police Abuse
Under Section 1983, 23 VAND. L. RPv. 1341, 1345-46 (1970) ("[Ihe criticism that
section 1983 claims inject the federal courts into essentially local regulatory matters and
disrupt the federal-state relationship must be balanced against the legitimate federal
interest in protecting the constitutional rights of citizens.").
Offering a different theory on the issue, one commentator has indicated that notions
of negligence and intentional conduct confuses the prima facie section 1983 cause of
action with the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Nahmod, Section 1983 and
the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 18 n.59 (1974) (concern should be
on whether a constitutional duty derived from the fourteenth amendment had been
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was a fear that section 1983 would create a body of federal
tort law.5 0
Another argument expressed an administrative concern
that the increasingly heavy load imposed on the federal courts
by civil rights actions would clog the federal courts with triv-
ial litigation and bring the administration of justice to a stand-
still.5 1 Still another argument was that allowing recovery for a
negligent deprivation of a constitutional right would put to
offensive use constitutional principles that developed as defen-
sive safeguards. 2
Despite these various theories, concerns and rationales ex-
pressed by courts and commentators, the Supreme Court on a
number of occasions skirted the question of whether negli-
gence was actionable under section 1983. 53 It was not until
breached); see also S. Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation,
68 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 n.20 (1982); S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at § 3.01-.22.
50. See Note, supra note 48, at 274.
51. See Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH L. REv. 5, 26-30 (1980).
A crushing weight of cases-whatever their worth-ultimately denigrates all
rights because the judiciary is not capable of sympathetically responding to all
the claims. Individual judges, as a matter of self-preservation, may begin to read
complaints in a grudging manner and to look for narrow resolutions that avoid
the most difficult issues .... To save time and to avoid conflict, judges may
hesitate to suggest changes in their colleagues' drafts, joining when they agree
with the conclusion but not the rationale.
Id. at 27.
But see Note, supra note 49, at 1345-46 (although the efficient administration of
justice is an important policy concern of the courts, a judicial method of decreasing the
volume of section 1983 litigation without affecting the practical availability of a remedy
to legitimate claimants does not appear to be available). Id. Eisenberg, Section 1983:
Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 482, 484 (1982)
("[S]ection 1983 cases are not overwhelming the federal courts; trivial claims, involving
little if any federal policy, do not dominate district court dockets ... [but] they are not
of a kind that warrant restricting either section 1983 or the Constitution.").
52. Comment, Tort Liability of Law Enforcement Officers Under Section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Acts, 30 LA. L. REV. 100, 114-15 (1969); see also Chafee, Safeguarding
Fundamental Human Rights: The Tasks of States and Nation, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
519 (1959). "It is very queer to try to protect human rights in the middle of the Twenti-
eth Century by a left-over from the days of General Grant." Id. at 529, cited in Monroe,
365 U.S. at 244. But see Note, supra note 49 at 1345-46 ("[T]he essentially defensive
nature of the safeguards is admitted but these safeguards define rights that are occasion-
ally infringed, and section 1983 makes these infringements actionable. As constitutional
issues are raised under 1983, it is more desirable to decide them on a case-by-case basis
than to attempt to establish any final all-encompassing rule of constitutional fault.").
53. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the Court did not specifically address the
issue. In dicta, however, Justice Rehnquist did not appear to favor negligent culpability
as a basis for recovery under section 1983. "[It] would be difficult to see why the survi-
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Parratt v. Taylor 54 that the issue was specifically addressed,
although in a somewhat summary fashion.55
C. The Parratt Decision and Its Limiting Effect
on Section 1983
In Parratt v. Taylor,56 the respondent, Lawrence Taylor,
was an inmate at the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Com-
plex.-7 He claimed that his property was negligently lost by
prison officials in violation of his rights under the fourteenth
amendment.5 8 Specifically, he asserted that he had been negli-
gently deprived of property without due process of law.59 In a
vors of an innocent bystander mistakenly shot by a policeman or negligently killed by a
sheriff driving a government vehicle, would not have claims equally cognizable under
section 1983. It is hard to perceive any logical stopping place to such a line of reason-
ing." Id. at 698-99. Two years later, in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1977),
the Court granted certiorari to address the question of "whether negligent failure to
mail certain of a prisoner's outgoing letters states a cause of action under Section 1983."
Id. at 559 n.6. But the Court did not address the negligence issue, because the Court
disposed of this case on immunity grounds. Id. at 566. In Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137 (1979), rev'g McCollan v. Tate, 575 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1978), the Court once again
granted certiorari to decide whether a section 1983 claim could be based in negligence.
However, the Court's opportunity to decide this question again evaporated. The Court
found that the respondent failed to satisfy the section 1983 threshold requirement that
the plaintiff be deprived of a right "secured by the Constitution and laws." Id. at 140.
As a result, the respondent had no claim cognizable under section 1983 and the issue of
whether negligence was actionable had to be left for another term. It is interesting to
note that Justice Rehnquist again cautioned that the negligence issue was a difficult
question:
Having been around this track once before in Procunier, supra, we have come
to the conclusion that the question whether an allegation of simple negligence is
sufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983 is more elusive than it appears
at first blush. It may well not be susceptible of a uniform answer across the
entire spectrum of conceivable constitutional violations which might be the sub-
ject of a § 1983 action. In any event, before the relationship between the defend-
ant's state of mind and his liability under § 1983 can be meaningfully explored, it
is necessary to isolate the precise constitutional violation with which he is
charged.
Id. at 139-40.
54. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
55. See, eg., Supreme Court Journey, supra note 21, at 598-99.
56. Parratt, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
57. Id. at 529.
58. Id.
59. Id. Taylor had paid for some hobby materials with two drafts drawn on his
inmate account. The materials were worth approximately $24. Soon thereafter, the
packages arrived at the prison where they were signed for by two employees who
worked in the prison hobby center. Taylor was in segregation at the time the materials
arrived so he was not permitted to receive them. The standard operating procedure at
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brief treatment of the issue,60 the Court said that the fact that
a constitutional wrong was negligently committed did not pre-
clude the possibility of sustaining an action under section
1983.61 Citing Baker62 and Monroe,63 the Court then stated
that "section 1983 affords a 'civil remedy' for deprivations of
federally protected rights caused by persons acting under
color of state law without any express requirement of a partic-
ular state of mind."'  The Court went on to indicate that the
focus must be on whether the two essential elements of a sec-
tion 1983 cause of action are present: "1) whether the conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under color
of state law; and 2) whether this conduct deprived a person of
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States. ' 65  Thus, if the constitutional
deprivation was caused by negligence, it would be actionable
under section 1983. Then the Court used a due process analy-
sis to limit the actionability under section 1983 of a negligent
deprivation of a property interest. To understand why the
Court limited section 1983 in this manner, one must under-
stand the background prior to Parratt.
In the years prior to Parratt, the Court was concerned that
a literal meaning of the Monroe decision would make section
1983 a "font of tort law."' 66 As a result, the Court in Parratt
began to search for a method to limit the scope of section
the prison for the handling of mail parcels is that upon arrival they are delivered to the
prisoner who signs for them and then goes to pick them up. Only the inmate to whom
the parcel is addressed may sign for it. Upon his release from segregation, Taylor went
to see various prison officials regarding the whereabouts of his parcels. No one was ever
able to find the packages or determine what caused their disappearance.
As a result, Taylor commenced an action against the warden and hobby manager.
He sought the recovery of the materials which had been deprived from him on account
of the negligence of the petitioners. Id. at 530.
An interesting behind-the-scenes look at Parratt giving details of the state's strategy
can be found in Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor: Opening and Closing the Door on Section
1983, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545, 554-67 (1982).
60. See Supreme Court Journey, supra note 21, at 596.
61. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 534.
62. 443 U.S. 137 (1978).
63. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 651, 663 (1977).
64. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535.
65. Id.
66. See Supreme Court Journey, supra note 21, at 591-92 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 701 (1976)); see also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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1983.67 After the Court concluded that negligence could be
actionable, it next examined whether Taylor had suffered an
unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process
of law. The Court found that although Taylor had been negli-
gently deprived of property, there had been no violation of
the fourteenth amendment.6 8 The fourteenth amendment pro-
tects only against deprivations "without due process of law." 69
The Court reasoned that while Taylor had been deprived of
his property, he was not deprived of due process since Ne-
braska provided a tort remedy granting him a post-depriva-
tion hearing.70 In other words, although Taylor was deprived
of his property, he had not been denied due process. Thus,
Parratt limited section 198371 by requiring a plaintiff who has
been negligently deprived of a property interest to seek a rem-
edy in the state courts under state tort principles, as opposed
to in the federal courts under section 1983.72
67. See Supreme Court Journey, supra note 21, at 591-92.
68. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 536-37.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 538-44. "The remedies provided could have fully compensated the re-
spondent for the property loss he suffered, and we hold that they are sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of due process." Id. at 544.
71. This is consistent with Justice Rehnquist's "caveat" in Paul, Procunier and
Baker concerning negligent deprivations of constitutional rights under section 1983.
Once again in Parratt, Justice Rehnquist voiced his concern:
Our decision today is fully consistent with our prior cases. To accept respon-
dent's argument that the conduct of the state officials in this case constituted a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment would almost necessarily result in turn-
ing every alleged injury which may have been inflicted by a state official acting
under 'color of law' into a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment cognizable
under § 1983. Such reasoning 'would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a
font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be ad-
ministered by the States.' Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 701 (1976). We do not
think that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment intended the Amendment
to play such a role in our society.
Id. at 544. See also Penland & Boardman, Section 1983 Contemporary Trends in the
Police Misconduct Arena, 20 IDAHO L. REv. 661, 699 (1984).
The Parratt declaration that alternative means to redress a deprivation can pro-
vide adequate due process, thus precluding a violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment, however, begs the obvious question of how much and what kind of process
is due. The courts have appeared eager to rely upon this aspect of the Parratt
decision to dispose of many civil rights claims that possess alternative remedies
available to redress plaintiffs' complaints.
Id.
72. A noted commentator has defined the principle of Parratt as follows: "Parratt
simply requires an examination of state remedies to see whether or not they are ade-
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The implication of this decision caused concern among
commentators.73 The concern was that Parratt would be used
to preclude a section 1983 claim where there was a negligent
deprivation of a liberty interest. 74
This concern has finally become a reality. In addition to
some lower courts applying the Parratt analysis to preclude
negligently deprived liberty interests from being actionable
quate to compensate a victim where negligent losses of property are alleged." Friedman,
supra note 59, at 547 (emphasis in original).
73. See Friedman, supra note 59, at 546.
The implications of the decision are enormous for section 1983 litigation. If the
Parratt decision is followed to its logical extreme, it would undermine the basis
for most section 1983 cases now brought in federal court. Since Monroe v. Pape,
it has been the law that an individual who has been deprived of a constitutional
right under color of state law is not required first to pursue common law tort
remedies in state court, or worse, to litigate exclusively in state court.
Id. at 546. See also Blum, The Implications ofParratt v. Taylorfor Section 1983 Litiga-
tion, 16 URB. LAW. 363, 369 (1984); Note, supra note 45, at 219.
74. See Friedman, supra note 59, at 547 ("If the principle [of Parratt] is to extend
further - to... negligent invasions of liberty interests, - then section 1983 would be
stripped of much of its force."); see also Blum, supra note 73, at 369; Note, supra note
45, at 219.
Recently in Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984), the Court extended the Par-
ratt analysis to intentional deprivations of property. "While Parratt is necessarily lim-
ited by its facts to negligent deprivations of property, it is evident, as the Court of
Appeals recognized, that its reasoning applies as well to intentional deprivations of
property." Id. at 3203.
Further, Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence in Parratt, did not seem to sooth the
anxiety of the commentators. Justice Blackmun questioned the Court's opinion with
respect to the availability of a subsequent state tort remedy satisfying the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Most importantly, I do not understand the Court to suggest that the provision of
'postdeprivation remedies,' ante, at 538, within a state system would cure the
unconstitutional nature of a state official's intentional act that deprives a person
of property. While the 'random and unauthorized' nature of negligent acts by
state employees makes it difficult for the State to 'provide a meaningful hearing
before the deprivation takes place,'ante, at 541, it is rare that the same can be
said of intentional acts by state employees. When it is possible for a State to
institute procedures to contain and direct the intentional actions of its officials, it
should be required as a matter of due process, to do so. See Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In the majority of such cases, the failure
to provide adequate process prior to inflicting the harm would violate the Due
Process Clause. The mere availability of a subsequent tort remedy before tribu-
nals of the same authority that, through its employees, deliberately inflicted the
harm complained of, might well not provide the due process of which the Four-
teenth Amendment speaks.
Parratt, 451 U.S. at 545-46 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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under section 1983,11 the Supreme Court in Daniels and Da-
vidson went even further and held that negligence does not
result in a violation of the due process clause.76 The result is
that a negligent deprivation of a liberty interest or any other
constitutionally protected interest is not actionable under sec-
tion 1983.
Prior to Daniels and Davidson, two interpretations had de-
veloped in the lower federal courts with respect to Parratt -
the narrow interpretation and the broad interpretation. The
narrow interpretation of Parratt was that Parratt encom-
passed only deprivations of property interests. 7 Therefore,
negligent and intentional deprivations of liberty and life were
actionable under section 1983.78 A broad interpretation of
Parratt encompassed negligent deprivations of life, liberty and
property interests. As a result, negligent deprivations of lib-
75. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
76. Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 664; Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 670.
77. See Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3203 (Parratt extends to intentional property
deprivations).
78. Comment, Due Process and Section 1983: Limiting Parratt v. Taylor to Negli-
gent Conduct, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 253, 254. Cases which have adopted a narrow read-
ing of Parratt: Wilson v. Beebe, 743 F.2d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 1984), vacated, 770 F.2d
578 (6th Cir. 1985) (en bane) ("Wilson asserts that Parratt applies only to negligent
deprivations of property which involve 'a random and unauthorized act by a state em-
ployee.., and that Parratt has no application where a negligent deprivation of a life or
liberty interest has been alleged. [The court] agreed."); Howard v. Fortenberry, 723
F.2d 1206, 1209 n.6 (5th Cir.), vacated in part, 728 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing
Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535) ("No particular state of mind is required to state a cause of
action under § 1983 for violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights; negligence will suf-
fice .... The defendants do not argue that Parratt defeats the plaintiff's claim for
deprivations of life and liberty because of the existence of an adequate post-deprivation
remedy."); Vail v. Board of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435, 1441 (7th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S.
Ct. 2144 (1984) ("The Supreme Court had the opportunity, but refused to expand Par-
ratt beyond 'a tortious loss of property or result of a random and unauthorized act by a
state employee' "); see also Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 395 (5th Cir. 1982)
("[W]e decline to give Parratt the sweeping interpretation required to encompass the
intentional deprivation of liberty involved in this case."); Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d
1252, 1263 (9th Cir. 1982) (negligent deprivation of life actionable under section 1983);
Elam v. Montgomery County, 573 F. Supp. 797, 803 (S.D. Ohio 1983) ("Parratt does
not stand for the proposition that the existence of any post deprivation remedies satisfies
due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment for deprivation of a liberty inter-
est, or of a substantive constitutional right.") (emphasis in original); Howse v. De Berry
Correctional Inst., 537 F. Supp. 1177, 1178 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) ("[P]laintiff's claim in
this case involves an alleged intentional deprivation of a liberty interest. This Court
does not believe that the Supreme Court intended the rationale of Parratt to extend
beyond facts basically similar to those in that case - that is, when only a negligent
deprivation of property is involved.") (emphasis in original).
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erty and life were not actionable under section 1983 because
the state court systems provide a due process remedy for those
deprivations.79 In Daniels and Davidson, the Court agreed
with the broad interpretation of Parratt o the extent that neg-
ligence was not actionable under section 1983. However, the
Court in Daniels and Davidson expanded the broad interpre-
tation by holding that negligent conduct does not violate the
due process clause.
II. THE DANIELS AND DAVIDSON DECISIONS
Roy Daniels was an inmate at the city jail in Richmond,
Virginia. While in jail, he slipped on a pillow that had been
negligently left on the stairs by Andrew Williams, a correc-
tional deputy assigned to the jail.8 1 Daniels alleged that Wil-
liams' negligence deprived him of his liberty interest in being
79. Comment, supra note 78, at 254. Courts which have adopted a broad reading of
Parratt: Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 337-38 (5th Cir. 1984) (Parratt analysis
applies to an alleged negligent deprivation of liberty due process); Daniels v. Williams,
720 F.2d 792, 796 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986) ("[W]e hold that the
Parratt analysis applies to deprivations of nonproperty interests which do not violate
substantive constitutional rights, including negligent deprivations of the liberty interest
in freedom from bodily injury."); Haygood v. Younger, 718 F.2d 1472, 1480 (9th Cir.
1983), vacated, 729 F.2d 613 (1984) ("We hold, that Parratt applies to situations in
which process prior to deprivation of liberty would not be feasible or practicable ....
[Tihe distinction between deprivations of property and those of liberty in that context is
unimportant."); State Bank of St. Charles v. Carnic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1147 (7th Cir.),
cerL denied, 464 U.S. 995 (1983) (Parratt is applicable to an alleged deprivation of life
or liberty); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981),
aff'd sub nom. Rush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983); White v. Booker, 598 F. Supp.
984, 987 (E.D. Va. 1984) ("Because plaintiff has a claim for a negligent deprivation of
his liberty interest, this case falls squarely within the Fourth Circuit's holding in Dan-
iels v. Williams .... To the extent that liberty deprivation is present, plaintiff's remedy
and right of recovery lies in the State Court system."); King v. Pace, 575 F. Supp. 1385,
1388 n.l (D. Mass. 1983) ("[IThe principles and analyses established by Parratt have
application to deprivations of life, liberty and property in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment."); Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869, 878 (E.D. Mich. 1983)
("Those cases which have extended the reasoning of Parratt and Ingraham to inten-
tional or reckless deprivations of liberty or property appear to be the sounder, more
well-reasoned cases."); Juncker v. Tinney, 549 F. Supp. 574, 576 (D. Md. 1982) ("This
Court holds that Parratt applies to the negligent deprivation of a liberty interest.");
Eberle v. Baumfalk, 524 F. Supp. 515, 517 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("By its literal terms Parratt
appears to apply with equal force to a Section 1983 claim for negligent infliction of
bodily injury."); Meshkov v. Abington Township, 517 F. Supp. 1280, 1286 (E.D. Pa.
1981).
80. Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 663.
81. Id.
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free from bodily injury.82 Daniels tried to circumvent the Par-
ratt analysis by asserting that because Williams was entitled to
the defense of sovereign immunity in a state tort suit, Daniels
was without an adequate state tort remedy.83 Consequently,
Daniels maintained that the deprivation of liberty was without
due process.84
In a somewhat summary fashion, the Supreme Court held
that negligence by a state official does not deprive an individ-
ual of life, liberty or property under the fourteenth
amendment: 85
We conclude that the Due Process Clause is simply not im-
plicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended
loss of or injury to life, liberty or property .... We think
that the actions of prison custodians in leaving a pillow on
the prison stairs, or mislaying an inmate's property, are quite
remote from the concerns just discussed. Far from an abuse
of power, lack of due care suggests no more than a failure to
measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person.86
The Court's rationale was the same as that expressed in
earlier cases,87 namely the fear of making the fourteenth
amendment "a font of tort law."18 8 Further, the majority felt
that to hold that an injury caused by negligence is a depriva-
tion within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment would
trivialize due process law.89
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 664.
85. Id. at 665.
86. Id. at 664-65.
87. Id. at 665-66; see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); see supra notes
53 and 71 and accompanying text.
88. Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 664-65.
89. Id. at 665. It is interesting to note Judge Keith's response to these remarks
about "font of tort law" and "trivialities of the courts" in his dissent in Wilson III, 770
F.2d at 593:
I would like to offer a few comments about Section 1983 actions. For some time
now concerns have been expressed throughout the federal courts about Section
1983 actions transforming the fourteenth amendment into "a font of tort law to
be superimposed upon whatever system may already be administered by the
States" or the frivolous case "trivializing the right of action provided in § 1983."
E.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 544, 101 S. Ct. at 1917 (quoting Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 701, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1160, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976)); 451 U.S. at 549,
101 S. Ct. at 1920 (Powell, J., concurring). Notwithstanding these sincere con-
cerns, it strikes me that it has long been settled that "Congress has the power to
enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a
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Apparently the Supreme Court believed that its due pro-
cess analysis in Parratt was not limiting the number of section
1983 claims as was originally intended. As a result, the Court
in Daniels took a more drastic approach by stating that negli-
gence does not implicate a fourteenth amendment due process
deprivation at all.
The companion case to Daniels was Davidson v. Cannon.90
In Davidson, the Court addressed the same issue as in Daniels.
Davidson was an inmate at the New Jersey State Prison at
Leesburg. 91 He brought a section 1983 action against prison
officials for injuries he sustained when they negligently failed
to protect him from another inmate. 92 Davidson alleged that
he was deprived of his liberty interest in personal security.93
The Supreme Court, finding Daniels controlling, affirmed the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,9 4 which had held that
Cannon's negligence did not amount to a deprivation of a lib-
erty interest within the meaning of the due process clause.95
The Supreme Court stated:
The guarantee of due process has never been understood to
mean that the state must guarantee due care on the part of
badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act
in accordance with their authority or misuse it." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at
171-72, 81 S. Ct. at 475-76. I believe that by focusing on the connection between
the use or abuse of state authority and the resultant deprivation of a litigant's
rights, the federal courts will readily be able to distinguish between the situation
in which the state actor's authority is merely incidental to the injury and the
situation in which the injury is only caused by virtue of the state actor's
authority.
With respect to frivolous section 1983 cases, Justice Stevens stated in another
context:
Frivolous cases should be treated as exactly that, and not as occasions for funda-
mental shifts in legal doctrine. Our legal system has developed procedures for
speedily disposing of unfounded claims; if they are inadequate to protect peti-
tioners from vexatious litigation, then there is something wrong with those pro-
cedures, not with the law ....
Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 104 S. Ct. 1989, 2012, 80 L.Ed.2d 590 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). I agree with Justice Stevens' com-
ments and find them fully applicable to the assault on Section 1983 actions.
Wilson 111, 770 F. 2d at 593.
90. 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
91. Id. at 669.
92. Id. at 669-70.
93. Id.
94. Davidson v. Cannon, 752 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
95. Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 670.
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its officials .... As we held in Daniels, the protections of the
Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are
just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials. 96
In Daniels, the majority did not distinguish between the
three types of due process.97 Presumably, since the facts in
Daniels involved only a procedural due process claim, the Da-
vidson decision should only apply to procedural due process.
However, the sentence in Davidson quoted above, which also
refers to substantive due process, raises grave concerns. The
majority opinion in Daniels does not mention substantive due
process specifically, but Davidson mentions it by referring to
Daniels. The question becomes one of discerning to which
types of due process the Daniels and Davidson decisions apply
- procedural, substantive or both.98 To fully understand the
implication of these decisions and how they relate to the neg-
ligent deprivation of a liberty interest, one must appreciate the
difference between substantive due process and procedural
due process.
III. DUE PROcEss DISTINCTION
The due process protection of the fourteenth amendment
has three aspects.99 First, it incorporates specific protections
found in the first ten amendments to the Constitution. 100 Sec-
ond, the fourteenth amendment contains what is referred to as
"substantive due process." 10 1 Third, the fourteenth amend-
ment also has a procedural due process aspect." 2 This Com-
ment shall explain the last two aspects of due process -
substantive and procedural - and their implication to Par-
ratt, Daniels and Davidson.
96. Id. at 670-71.
97. However, Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion enumerates the three differ-
ent types of due process and explains each. 106 S. Ct. at 677-78 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). See infra notes 99-101, 166-68 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 164 & 171-72 and accompanying text.
99. Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 677-81 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also S. NAHMOD,
supra note 2, at § 3.08.
100. Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 677 (Stevens, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 678; see also S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at § 3.08.
102. Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 678 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also S. NAHMOD, supra
note 2, at § 3.08.
1986]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
A. Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process10 3 is a rather nebulous concept.
Essentially, substantive due process describes the concept
whereby the Court can overrule an item of legislation or de-
clare a particular act unconstitutional because the Court dis-
agrees with its substance under a section of the Constitution
that speaks only of a process due an individual.l°4
The due process clause creates certain substantive rights
that are not set forth explicitly in the first ten amendments of
the Constitution. 105 Most substantive rights are derived indi-
rectly from the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 10 6  In other
words, substantive due process is a phrase to describe the fact
that the Supreme Court has interpreted the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment to contain certain substantive
rights based mainly, although not explicitly, on the Bill of
Rights,107 and the privilege and immunities clause. 0 8
The Supreme Court, in Moore v. East Cleveland,'0 9 dis-
cussed the fact that a number of protections of substantive due
process are not set forth explicitly:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its con-
tent cannot be determined by reference to any code. The
best that can be said is that through the course of this
Court's decision it has represented the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the
individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands
of organized society.
... [T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise
terms of the specific guarantees else-where provided in the
Constitution. It is a rational continuum which, broadly
103. Substantive due process is usually associated with the Supreme Court's at-
tempt in the early part of the century to prohibit government economic regulation.
Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled, Day Brite Lighting, Inc.
v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937). See Nowak, supra note 3, at 418; TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTIONAL LAW
574 (1978).
104. Nowak, supra note 3, at 417-18.
105. Henderson v. Counts, 544 F. Supp. 149, 152 (E.D. Va. 1982).
106. Id.
107. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499-1500 (11th Cir. 1985); Brown
v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 366 (7th Cir. 1983).
108. Bullard v. Valentine, 592 F.Supp. 774, 776 (E.D. Tenn. 1984).
109. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints... and which also
recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must,
that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of
the states needs asserted to justify their abridgment. 11
Examples of substantive due process protections include the
right to pass freely from state to state, to carry on interstate
commerce, to contract, to own property, to engage in life's
common occupations, to gain and acquire useful knowledge,
to marry and have children, to worship God, to be free from
illegal searches and seizures of our persons, and to be free
from unnecessary violence at the hands of law enforcement.'
The Court has recognized that there are risks associated
with substantive due process,' 1 2 especially when the judiciary
is able to give added protection to certain substantive liberties
without the guidelines of more specific provisions of the Bill of
Rights.113 However, the concern that this approach to the due
process clause is going to lead judges to roam at large in the
constitutional field '1 4 is short-lived when it is learned that lim-
its on substantive due process do not come "from drawing ar-
bitrary lines but rather from careful 'respect for the teaching
of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that un-
derlie our society.' "115
The rationale the Court uses to control the substance of
legislation or governmental acts under the due process clause
is that certain types of lawmaking or state action go beyond
any proper aspect of government activity.1 1 6 In other words,
the Court views the act as incompatible with the democratic
system of government and individual liberty.1 7 Any life, lib-
erty or property interest limited by such a law or taken by
such an act is a constitutional violation because the Constitu-
tion never granted the government the ability to pass such a
110. Id. at 501-02 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, i.,
dissenting).
111. Bullard, 592 F. Supp. at 776.
112. Moore, 431 U.S. at 502; see also Justice White's dissent in Moore at 541-52.
113. Moore, 431 U.S. at 502.
114. Id. at 544 (White, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 503 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
116. Nowak, supra note 3, at 418.
117. Id.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
law or to commit such an act.II Thus, a substantive due pro-
cess claim alleges that the state's conduct is inherently imper-
missible, and will remain unjustified, regardless of any
protective or remedial procedures it provides.11 9
In the law enforcement context where many liberty inter-
ests are implicated, the test used to determine whether there
has been a violation of substantive due process is to determine
whether the conduct "shocks the conscience" of the court.12 °
This test was first enumerated in Rochin v. California.1 21 The
Court explained that a substantive due process violation oc-
curs when the government engages in conduct which offends
"those canons of decency and fairness which express the no-
tions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those
charged with the most heinous offenses."1 22 The Court went
on to say that substantive due process is violated by state con-
duct that "shocks the conscience" of the court or constitutes
force that is so brutal so as to offend even hardened sensibili-
ties. 123 In determining whether the state's conduct "shocks
the conscience," Judge Friendly in Johnson v. Glick 124 offered
a number of considerations to take into account:
In determining whether the constitutional line has been
crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need for the
application of force, the relationship between the need and
the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury in-
flicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadisti-
cally for the very purpose of causing harm. 125
118. Id.
119. Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1500; Madden v. City of Meriden, 602 F. Supp. 1160,
1166 (D. Conn. 1985); Ramos v. Gallo, 596 F. Supp. 833, 837 (D. Mass. 1984). See also
Comment, A Question ofAnalysis: Civil Rights Litigation Under 42 U.S. C. Section 1983,
19 NEw ENG. L. REv. 575, 587 (1984).
120. Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1500 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73
(1952)); see Wilson, 743 F.2d at 349; Gumz v. Morrisette, 722 F.2d 1395, 1400 (7th Cir.
1985); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980); Ramos, 596 F. Supp. at 837;
Barnier, 565 F. Supp. at 879; see also Blum, supra note 73, at 374-75; Comment, supra
note 119, at 590.
121. 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
122. Id. at 169; see also Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1500.
123. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172; Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1500.
124. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
125. Id. at 1033.
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Thus, in the law enforcement context, the courts have held
that a police officer's infliction of personal injury on an indi-
vidual by an application of undue or excessive force which
"shocks the conscience" of the court deprives that individual
of liberty without due process and is therefore a substantive
due process violation which is actionable under section
1983. 126
Prior to Daniels and Davidson, the next question to ask
with respect to substantive due process would have been
whether a substantive due process violation would be pre-
cluded from actionability under section 1983 because there ex-
isted an available state tort remedy. Before Daniels and
Davidson, there appeared to be a general consensus among the
lower federal courts that the Parratt analysis did not apply to
substantive due process violations. 127 However, after Daniels
and Davidson, if a substantive due process violation occurs be-
cause of a state actor's negligence, it is apparently not actiona-
ble under section 1983.
Further, because of the decisions in Daniels and Davidson,
there appears to be a question as to whether a negligent act
can ever rise to the level of a substantive due process viola-
tion.128 If a negligent act is such that it "shocks the con-
science" of the court, therefore rising to the level of a
substantive due process violation, would this be a constitu-
126. Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501; see Wilson, 743 F.2d at 349 ('This substantive due
process right to enjoy the security of life and limb has been extended to include the right
to be free from the use of excessive force by law enforcement officers."); Black v. Ste-
phens, 662 F.2d 181, 188 (3rd Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 1008, reh'g denied,
456 U.S. 950 (1982); Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981).
127. Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1500; Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1239
n.39 (7th Cir. 1984); Wilson, 743 F.2d at 350; Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 327 (5th
Cir. 1984) ("Parratt applies only when a plaintiff asserts a violation of procedural due
process. Parratt is irrelevant if the plaintiff alleges a violation of a substantive right
protected by the Constitution against infringement by state governments."); Guenther
v. Holmgren, 738 F.2d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 1984); Daniels, 720 F.2d at 796 n.3; Camic,
712 F.2d at 1147 n.5; Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 872 (7th Cir. 1983) (district
court's conclusion that the plaintiff's fourth amendment rights were violated must not
be disturbed on the basis of Parratt); Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 704 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 937 (1982); Kolpak v. Bell, 619 F. Supp. 359, 376 (N.D.
Ill. 1985); Bullard, 592 F. Supp. at 775, 778-79; Barnier, 565 F. Supp. at 880; Begg v.
Moffitt, 555 F. Supp. 1344, 1362 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Juncker, 549 F. Supp. at 582; Holmes
v. Wampler, 546 F. Supp. 500, 503 (E.D. Va. 1982); Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp.
605, 613-18 (D. Mass. 1982); see also Blum, supra note 73, at 374.
128. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
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tional violation which is actionable under section 1983? The
first question that needs to be answered is whether negligence
can rise to the level of a substantive due process violation
which in turn is a constitutional violation. The second ques-
tion is what degree of culpability should be actionable under
section 1983 for a substantive due process violation. 129 As will
be discussed in more detail later in the analysis, this Comment
proposes that all types of culpable conduct, negligent or other-
wise, which rise to the level of substantive due process viola-
tions are constitutional violations and should therefore be
actionable under section 1983.
B. Procedural Due Process
There are many injuries inflicted by the government on
persons which impinge on their liberty interest to be free from
bodily harm but which do not cross the constitutional line to
become substantive due process violations. 130  If a claimant
were injured by a state actor and the action did not amount to
a substantive due process violation, then the claimant could
assert a procedural due process violation. One such example
is the situation in Daniels, where a prison inmate was injured
when he slipped on a pillow negligently left on the stairs by a
correctional deputy.1 3 ' Another example involves the David-
son situation, where a prisoner was harmed because of the
negligence of a prison official in failing to protect him from a
129. In the lower courts, there also was a question as to what degree of culpability
was necessary for a substantive due process violation to be actionable under section
1983. See, eg., Bullard, 592 F. Supp. at 775 (" [T]his Court can agree with those courts
that have interpreted Parratt to encompass at least negligent deprivations of life, liberty
and property."). Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist in his opinion in Daniels indicates
that negligence can never implicate due process. See supra notes 85-86 and accompany-
ing text. However, this commentator takes exception to this, see infra notes 164-76 and
accompanying text.
130. An example of this situation is where a police officer negligently shoots a per-
son in the foot. This implicates a liberty interest. However, it is unlikely that this
conduct "shocks the conscience" and therefore, it is not a substantive due process viola-
tion which under the Parratt analysis would not be redressable under section 1983.
It is interesting to note that a shot in the back, as in Wilson, was recognized by
Judge Keith as possibly "shocking the conscience" while a shot in the foot may not be
recognized as such. See Comment, supra note 119, at 593 ("A standard that measures
constitutional deprivations based on the apparent distinction between 'ten licks rather
than five' is clearly in need of reconsideration.").
131. Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 663; see also Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 337
(5th Cir. 1984); Daniels, 720 F.2d at 794.
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third person. 132 Still another case involved a prison inmate
who burned himself on a radiator and alleged a deprivation of
liberty because prison officials were negligent in not providing
covers for the radiators. 133 Prior to Daniels and Davidson,
these non-substantive due process violations appeared to be
precluded from actionability under section 1983 because of
the Parratt analysis. 134 Now, they are precluded from action-
ability because Daniels and Davidson indicate that they are not
constitutional violations. To understand why claimants
brought claims for negligent actions which did not rise to the
level of substantive due process violations, one must under-
stand procedural due process.
When an individual asserts a procedural due process claim
for a liberty deprivation, as opposed to a substantive due pro-
cess violation, that person must allege that the state has un-
lawfully interfered with a protected liberty interest by failing
to provide adequate procedural safeguards. 35 Thus, the claim
focuses on the procedures utilized by the state in effecting the
deprivation of liberty, which the plaintiff asserts were inade-
quate in light of the importance of the interests involved. 36
Further, it is not enough to assert a deprivation of an interest
by a person acting under color of state law. 37 The claimant
must also allege that the requirements of due process were not
satisfied by available state procedures for challenging the
deprivation. 138
132. Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 669.
133. Juncker, 549 F. Supp. at 575; see also Thibodeaux, 740 F.2d at 337.
134. Nowak, supra note 3, at 554-62. In this Comment, procedural due process
will sometimes be referred to as non-substantive due process.
135. Ramos, 596 F. Supp. at 837; see also Augustine, 740 F.2d at 327; Nowak, supra
note 3, at 555-56. The adequate procedural safeguards referred to are:
(1) adequate notice of the charges or basis for government action; (2) a neutral
decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to make an oral presentation to the decision-
maker; (4) an opportunity to present evidence or witnesses to the decision-
maker; (5) a chance to confront and cross-examine witnesses or evidence to be
used against the individual; (6) the right to have an attorney present the individ-
ual's case to the decision-maker; (7) a decision based on the record with a state-
ment of reasons for the decision.
136. Ramos, 596 F. Supp. at 837; see also S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at § 3.08.
137. Thibodeaux, 740 F.2d at 334.
138. Id.
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There are two forms of procedural due process: pre-depri-
vation due process and post-deprivation due process.1 39 To
fully understand the reasons for pre-deprivation and post-dep-
rivation due process, one must understand the underlying val-
ues of due process. The concept of due process incorporates
notions of fair notice and warning. 140 Furthermore, a funda-
mental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 41 It
has been held that the individual must have the opportunity to
be heard before there can be the deprivation of a protected
interest. 42 Thus, absent the necessity for quick action,1 43 or
the impracticality of providing any pre-deprivation process at
all, the Constitution requires pre-deprivation notice and op-
portunity to be heard. 144
For example, prior to Daniels and Davidson, if an official
negligently harmed an individual,1 45 thereby implicating that
person's liberty interest, and the harm did not rise to the level
of a substantive due process violation, then the only avenue
that would have been open to the injured party would have
been to initiate a claim based upon a violation of procedural
due process. The claimant would have asserted that there had
been a deprivation of a liberty interest without some sort of
pre-deprivation or post-deprivation due process. However,
prior to Daniels and Davidson, some lower federal courts used
139. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 538.
140. See, e.g., Postscript Enterprises, Inc. v. Whaley, 658 F.2d 1249, 1254 (5th Cir.
1981); Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26, 28 (8th Cir. 1980).
141. See, e.g., Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye & Finishing Co., 725
F.2d 843, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co. v. Bakery
Confectionary & Tobacco Workers Union, 104 S. Ct. 3554 (1984); Lordermill v. Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ., 721 F.2d 550, 563 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
142. See, e.g., Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189, 1194-95 (8th Cir. 1974); Peacock v.
Board of Regents, 380 F. Supp. 108 (D.C. Ariz. 1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1049 (1975).
143. For examples of the exception to the general rule due to need for quick action
or impracticality, see Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, (1950)
(seizure of harmful drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947) (seizure of
bank's assets due to doubts about its management); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City
of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1908) (seizure of tainted food from warehouse).
144. Begg, 555 F. Supp. at 1350-51.
145. Another example could involve a police officer who harms an individual inten-
tionally; however, this Comment is limited to only negligently inflicted injuries.
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the Parratt analysis to preclude procedural due process claims
from being actionable under section 1983.146
The Court in Parratt enumerated the reasons 47 for up-
holding the taking of property even though the taking had
been done without any pre-deprivation due process.1 48  The
Court reasoned that when a state employee commits a random
and unauthorized act which results in harm to an individual,
the state cannot precisely predict when the injury or loss will
occur.149 Thus, the Court opined that it is not only impracti-
cal but impossible to provide a pre-deprivation hearing in such
situations.5 0 Further, the Court held that since there was an
available post-deprivation remedy - a suit for damages under
state tort law - the requirements of due process were satis-
fied.1 51 In its concluding paragraph, the Court stated that be-
cause the alleged deprivation of property was not without due
process of law and, as a result, not a fourteenth amendment
violation, there was no cause of action under section 1983.152
As has been stated previously, the Court in Daniels and
Davidson effectively abandoned the Parratt analysis for negli-
gent due process deprivations by holding that negligence does
not violate the due process clause.'53 It is therefore unclear
what degree of culpable conduct is actionable under section
146. Daniels, 720 F.2d at 796-97. ("Daniels alleges that Williams' negligence in
leaving a pillow on the stairs deprived him of a liberty interest .... [It was not] possible
for the state to provide a predeprivation hearing since the state could not predict when
the alleged loss would occur. Consequently, Parratt applies to this case."). In Juncker,
549 F. Supp. at 576, the Maryland district court stated:
['l]his case involves.., a liberty interest, namely, plaintiff's right not to be
subjected to physical injury without due process of law .... [Ihe State is no
more able to predict the deprivation, and a pre-deprivation hearing is no more
possible, when the deprivation involves a liberty interest than when it involves a
property interest. Therefore, if plaintiff has an adequate post-deprivation rem-
edy in state court, that should satisfy the requirements of due process and plain-
tiff should not be permitted to bring a § 1983 claim in federal court.
Id.; see also Thibodeaux, 740 F.2d at 334-35.
147. See supra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
148. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541; see also Thibodeaux, 740 F.2d at 334-35.
149. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541; see also Thibodeaux, 740 F.2d at 335; Daniels, 720
F.2d at 796-97; Juncker, 549 F. Supp. at 576.
150. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541.
151. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541-44; see also Thibodeaux, 740 F.2d at 335; Juncker,
549 F. Supp. at 576.
152. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544; see also Thibodeaux, 740 F.2d at 335.
153. See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
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1983 for non-substantive (procedural) due process violations
that involve liberty deprivations. 154 Prior to Daniels and Da-
vidson, some lower federal courts had applied Parratt to negli-
gent deprivations of liberty which involved procedural due
process violations. 155
With respect to intentional conduct, some lower federal
courts applied the Parratt analysis to intentional deprivations
of liberty that did not rise to the level of a substantive due
process violation.156 In light of the Daniels and Davidson deci-
sions, the question remains: what is the minimum degree of
culpability for a non-substantive due process liberty depriva-
tion to be actionable under section 1983?
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION
A. Introduction to Analysis and Recommendation
As stated before, most lower federal courts did not pre-
clude from section 1983 actionability a deprivation of a liberty
interest that rises to the level of a substantive due process vio-
lation.1 57 However, because of Daniels and Davidson, it is un-
clear whether a negligently deprived liberty interest that rises
to the level of a substantive due process violation is a constitu-
tional violation and whether it is actionable under section
1983.151 This Comment proposes in Part B that negligent
154. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Bullard, 592 F. Supp. at 777.
155. See Thibodeaux, 740 F.2d at 334-36; Daniels, 720 F.2d at 796 ("we hold that
the Parratt analysis applies to deprivations which do not violate substantive constitu-
tional rights, including negligent deprivations of the liberty interest in freedom from
bodily injury"); Haygood, 718 F.2d at 1480; Flores v. Edinburg Consol. Indep. School
Dist., 554 F. Supp. 974, 978 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Irshad v. Spann, 543 F. Supp. 922, 927
n.1 (E.D. Va. 1982); Pantoja v. City of Gonzales, 538 F. Supp. 335, 339 n.6 (N.D. Cal.
1982); Eberle v. Baumfolk, 524 F. Supp. 515, 517-18 (N.D. Ili. 1981); Peery v. Davis,
524 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Va. 1981).
156. See Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981)
("Under [the Parratt] decision we may assume, without deciding, that the alleged as-
sault and battery deprived the appellant of 'liberty' within the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment and focus our attention on whether this was done 'without due
process of law.' "); Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 515 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1069 (1982). Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869, 878 (E.D. Mich. 1983) ("Those
cases which have extended the reasoning of Parratt and Ingraham to intentional or
reckless deprivations of liberty or property appear to be the sounder, more well-rea-
soned cases.").
157. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
158. Of course, this presupposes that negligence can result in a substantive due
process violation. In Wilson II, 743 F.2d at 350, Judge Keith said:
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conduct which rises to the level of a substantive due process
violation is a constitutional violation and should be actionable
under section 1983. Consequentially, it should not be rele-
In most cases where section 1983 liability has been found as a consequence of the
use of excessive force by law enforcement officials, the offending conduct was
intentional. However, this does not foreclose the possibility that the negligent
use of excessive force may also provide the basis for section 1983 liability.
Id. (emphasis added).
In Wilson III, 770 F.2d 578, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated
Wilson L The court, sitting en banc in Wilson II, 770 F.2d at 586, said, "[W]e know of
no case in which negligent conduct has been held to constitute a substantive due process
violation of the type described in Rochin v. California and Johnson v. Glick, and con-
clude that a substantive due process violation of this kind does require an intentional
act." Judge Keith concurred in part and dissented in part with the majority in Wilson
III. Judge Keith in his dissent said, "But even though the majority accurately identifies
the substantive constitutional right violated, the majority concludes that a substantive
due process violation of the kind found in Rochin and Johnson v. Glick 'require[s] an
intentional act.' I cannot agree." Id. at 592 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
This reasoning is apparent when applied to the following fact pattern: A police of-
ficer pulls over a suspect on the highway. The suspect is known by the officer to be non-
violent. When the officer gets to the car door window, he is negligent in the handling of
his weapon and the gun discharges hitting the suspect in the head and thereby killing
him. Could not this negligent conduct by the officer rise to the level of a substantive due
process violation? Further, if one applies the Johnson v. Glick factors, 481 F.2d at 1033,
see supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text, one can see that the above fact pattern
could be an example where negligent conduct could rise to the level of a substantive due
process violation.
The first factor to consider is the need for the application of force. Johnson, 481 F.
2d at 1033. In the above fact pattern, the suspect was doing nothing but sitting in a car.
Further, the suspect was known by the officer to be non-violent. Second, one has to
examine the relationship between the need and the amount of force used. Id. There
was no need for the amount of force used in the above fact pattern, especially force that
killed. Third, the extent of the injury inflicted has to be determined. Id. The suspect
was killed, which is arguably the worst injury of all. Finally, one must see whether the
force applied was in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or if the force
was used maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Id.
Although the force used in the above example was perhaps not used for malicious pur-
poses, it certainly was not used in a good faith effort to restore discipline. The suspect
was known by the officer to be non-violent. Further, the suspect was sitting in the car
and was not attempting escape or exhibiting any acts which might cause the officer
concern. Thus, there was no need for the application of the force, no need for the
amount of force used, the force inflicted caused the worst possible injury (death), and
there was no good faith effort to maintain order or to restore discipline. Consequently,
the above fact pattern illustrates a negligent act which may rise to level of a substantive
due process violation. To preclude from actionability a theory because no case to date
presents the proper facts for that theory smacks of judicial irresponsibility. This Com-
ment proposes that when the proper facts present themselves for negligent conduct to
rise to the level of a substantive due process violation, then this substantive due process
violation is, first, a constitutional violation and, second, should be actionable under sec-
tion 1983.
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gated to the state court system for remedy under state tort
doctrine.
With respect to procedural due process violations involv-
ing a liberty interest, the Daniels and Davidson decisions set-
tled the controversy to some extent by holding that negligence
by a state official does not violate the due process clause.
However, prior to Daniels and Davidson, some lower courts
had improperly applied the Parratt analysis to all degrees of
culpability including intentional conduct that resulted in a lib-
erty deprivation. 15 9 As a result, those courts precluded reck-
less and intentional conduct from actionability under section
1983 because of the available state tort remedy analysis ex-
pounded in Parratt. Precluding from section 1983 actionabil-
ity all degrees of culpability which arise in non-substantive
due process cases is arbitrary, unfair and should be changed.
For example, what becomes of the individual who is harmed
by an official whose action did not rise to the level of substan-
tive due process violation, but the liberty deprivation involved
a greater degree of culpability than negligence? 160
Prior to Daniels and Davidson, which precluded negligence
as a basis for a violation of the due process clause, the devel-
oping trend was that if the act by the official did not rise to the
level of a substantive due process violation, an individual who
has been harmed and deprived of a liberty interest by an offi-
cial exhibiting any degree of culpability, whether it be negli-
gent or intentional conduct, was unable to seek redress in the
federal courts under section 1983.161 Indeed, one must be sen-
sitive to the fact that because of the fear of trivializing the due
process clause and making section 1983 a "font of tort law,"
there must be a limit on a deprived liberty interest which does
not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation.
Daniels and Davidson put that limit into place by holding that
159. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
160. See Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 666 n.3 ("[A]ccordingly, this case affords us no
occasion to consider whether something less than intentional conduct, such as reckless-
ness or 'gross negligence' is enough to trigger the protection of the Due Process
Clause."); see also Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 671 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I do believe
however, that official conduct which causes personal injury due to recklessness or delib-
erate indifference, does deprive the victim of liberty within the meaning of the four-
teenth amendment.").
161. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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negligence does not violate the due process clause, although
arguably only procedural due process is implicated by those
holdings. As a result, this Comment proposes in Part C that
gross negligence or recklessness 162 be the minimum standard
for determining which non-substantive due process violations
of liberty interests become actionable under section 1983.
This minimum standard would take into account both Daniels
and Davidson, and would preclude "garden variety" negli-
gence claims from section 1983 actionability.
A deprived liberty interest that is a non-substantive due
process violation and which invokes more culpability than
negligence, however, would be actionable under section 1983.
Thus, gross negligence and intentional conduct should be ac-
tionable under section 1983 for any non-substantive due pro-
cess violation of a liberty interest. This Comment will only
discuss the minimum standard of culpability for a deprivation
of a non-substantive due process violation of a liberty
interest. 16
3
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965) defines reckless disregard of
safety:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an
act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do,
knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man
to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical
harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which
is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 comment g (1965):
Negligence and recklessness contrasted. Reckless misconduct differs from negli-
gence in several important particulars. It differs from that form of negligence
which consists in mere inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure to
take precautions to enable the actor adequately to cope with a possible or prob-
able future emergency, in that reckless misconduct requires a conscious choice of
a course of action, either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved
in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reason-
able man. It differs not only from the above-mentioned form of negligence, but
also from that negligence which consists in intentionally doing an act with
knowledge that it contains a risk of harm to others, in that the actor to be reck-
less must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater in
amount than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. The differ-
ence between reckless misconduct and conduct involving only such a quantum of
risk as is necessary to make it negligent is a difference of degree in the degree of
the risk, but this difference of degree is so marked as to amount substantially to a
difference in kind.
163. Since intentional conduct involves a higher degree of culpability, gross negli-
gence or recklessness would be the minimum level of culpable conduct.
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B. Negligent Deprivation of a Liberty Interest Which Rises
to the Level of a Substantive Due Process Violation
All conduct which results in a substantive due process vio-
lation should be actionable under section 1983. However, the
focus in this section pertaining to substantive due process vio-
lations will only be on the minimum degree of culpability,
negligence. As was stated earlier, the Court in Daniels does
limit its holding to a specific type of due process. This Com-
ment agrees with the Daniels decision to the extent that its
holding applies to procedural due process. However, this
Comment proposes that the Daniels and Davidson decisions
should not be applied to negligent deprivations which rise to
the level of a due process violation.
If one first examines the Daniels decision from an interpre-
tive standpoint, one can see that there is a question as to
whether substantive due process is included in that decision.
The majority opinion never specifically mentions the three
types of due process. 164 Whether the Court intended to in-
clude all three types of due process in its holding is open to
speculation.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens agreed with the
majority that Daniels could not prevail under section 1983.165
Justice Stevens noted, however, that the majority failed to dis-
.tinguish between the three types of due process. 166 Thought-
164. See Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 662; Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 668.
165. Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 667 (Stevens, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 677-79 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens stated:
We should begin by identifying the precise constitutional claims that petitioners
[Daniels and Davidson] have advanced. It is not enough to note that they rely on
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for that Clause is the
source of three different kinds of constitutional protection .... The type of
Fourteenth Amendment interest that is implicated has important effects on the
nature of the constitutional claim and the availability of § 1983 relief. If the
claim is in the first category (a violation of one of the specific constitutional
guarantees of the Bill of Rights), a plaintiff may invoke § 1983 regardless of the
availability of a state remedy .... [I]f the claim is in the second category (a
violation of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause), a plaintiff
may also invoke § 1983 regardless of the availability of a state remedy .... A
claim in the third category - a procedural due process claim - is fundamen-
tally different .... In a procedural due process claim, it is not the deprivation of
property or liberty that is unconstitutional; it is the deprivation of property or
liberty without due process of law - without adequate procedures.
Id. at 678-79.
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fully, Justice Stevens distinguished between substantive due
process and procedural due process, 167 stating that the cases at
hand only involved procedural due process claims.1 68 Implicit
in his concurrence is the non-applicability of the Daniels and
Davidson opinions to substantive due process violations.1 69
The implication is that if a negligent act rises to the level of a
substantive due process violation, then "the constitutional vio-
lation is complete."1 70 Thus, when the majority held that neg-
ligence does not implicate the due process clause, it implied
that negligence does not implicate procedural due process, and
if a negligent deprivation is such that it is a substantive due
process violation, then it is a constitutional violation.
Although the majority in Daniels did not explicitly men-
tion substantive due process in its holding, the Court did refer
to it in Davidson 171 in a reference to the Daniels decision. 172 It
is a matter of interpretation whether the Court's holding in
167. Id. at 678-79 (Stevens, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 680 ("[T]he cases [Daniels and Davidson] raise only procedural due pro-
cess claims"); see also Daniels, 748 F.2d 229, 230 n.1 (4th Cir. 1984) ("There is no claim
of any substantive due process violation"), cited in Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 679, n.16
(Stevens, J., concurring).
169. Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 679-80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Neither Daniels nor Davidson argues in this Court that the prison authorities'
actions violated specific constitutional guarantees incorporated by the Four-
teenth Amendment. Neither now claims, for instance that his rights under the
Eighth Amendment were violated. Similarly, I do not believe petitioners have
raised a colorable violation of "substantive due process." Rather their claims are
of the third kind: Daniels and Davidson attack the validity of the procedures that
Virginia and New Jersey, respectively, provide for prisoners who seek redress for
physical injury caused by the negligence of corrections officers.
Id. at 679-80 (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 678 ("[I]f the Federal Constitution prohibits a State from taking certain
action 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them, 'the consti-
tutional [substantive due process] violation is complete as soon as the prohibited action
is taken.").
'Deprivation,' it seems to me, identifies, not the actor's state of mind, but the
victim's infringement or loss. The harm to a prisoner is the same whether a
pillow is left on a stair negligently, recklessly, or intentionally; so too, the harm
resulting to a prisoner from an attack is the same whether his request for protec-
tion is ignored negligently, recklessly, or deliberately. In each instance, the pris-
oner is losing - being 'deprived' of - an aspect of liberty as the result, in part,
of a form of state action.
Id. at 680. The implication is that if a negligent deprivation rose to the level of a sub-
stantive due process violation, then the constitutional violation would be complete.
171. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
172. Id.
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Davidson encompasses substantive due process because the
Court in Daniels did not expressly mention it. The Daniels
and Davidson decisions should not be applied to substantive
due process violations because: (1) The majority failed to spe-
cifically mention substantive due process, and (2) Justice Ste-
vens distinguished substantive due process from procedural
due process in his concurring opinion. Furthermore, other
support exists for the proposition that if a negligent act
"shocks the conscience" of the court and is deemed to be a
substantive due process violation, it is then a constitutional
violation.
By definition, if a negligent act is such that it causes a lib-
erty deprivation which rises to the level of a substantive due
process violation, it in turn would be a prima facie constitu-
tional violation. Further, if a substantive due process viola-
tion has occurred, it hardly matters to the victim whether the
substantive due process violation was caused by negligence,
gross negligence, recklessness or intentional conduct. The fact
is that the victim has suffered an injury or harm resulting in a
substantive due process violation. To preclude actionability
because the official acted with one degree of culpability as op-
posed to another deviates from the underlying rationale of
substantive due process. The denial of substantive due process
is a constitutional violation at the moment the harm occurs, 173
even if it was caused by negligent conduct.
Moreover, if the Court takes the rigid approach that negli-
gent conduct can never implicate the concerns of the due pro-
cess clause, 174 then the Court is not taking into account all
possible circumstances. Several courts observed that it was
possible for a negligent act to rise to the level of a substantive
173. Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1500.
174. See Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 673 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Finally, I agree that mere negligent activity ordinarily will not amount to an
abuse of state power. Where the Court today errs, in this author's view, is in
elevating this sensible rule of thumb to the status of inflexible constitutional
dogma. The Court declares that negligent activity can never implicate the con-
cerns of the Due Process Clause. I see no justification for this rigid view. In
some cases, by any reasonable standard, governmental negligence is an abuse of
power.
Id. at 674 (emphasis in original).
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due process violation, and which in turn could be actionable
under section 1983.175
Finally, if one examines closely the facts in Daniels and
Davidson, neither rises to the level of substantive due process
violations.176 Only procedural due process is implicated.
Thus, the Daniels and Davidson decisions should not be
applied to substantive due process violations. If an official
acts negligently, thereby depriving a person of a protected lib-
erty interest, and the act rises to the level of a substantive due
process violation, it violates the fourteenth amendment and is,
therefore, a constitutional violation.
175. See Hewitt v. City of Truth or Consequences, 758 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1985).
[Negligent conduct may under appropriate circumstances give rise to a constitu-
tional deprivation remediable under section 1983.
... In considering when negligent conduct may constitute a substantive de-
nial of due process, we are guided by the analysis applied in cases involving
alleged use of excessive force. Not all force used by police rises to a constitu-
tional violation. But the use of excessive force on a pretrial detainee deprives the
victim of life or liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 1378-79 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). See Masop v. Coughlin, 770
F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1985) (a merely negligent act may give rise to a cause of action under
section 1983 in appropriate circumstances). See also supra note 158 and accompanying
text. The facts of Wilson I and Wilson II are as follows: State trooper Thomas Beebe
was searching for a burglary suspect in a wooded area at night. Soon thereafter, a man
fitting the description of the suspect came walking down the road. Wilson I, 743 F.2d at
344. Officer Beebe recognized that the suspect fit the description and told the man to
stop. Id. The man stopped, Officer Beebe removed his thirty-eight caliber pistol and
cocked it. Then he attempted to handcuff the man. While attempting to handcuff the
suspect a second time, Officer Beebe's gun accidentally went off, striking the suspect in
the back. The suspect was identified as the plaintiff, Larry Wilson. Mr. Wilson suffered
injuries to the spine, intestine and gall bladder. Id. at 343-44. Regarding Officer
Beebe's conduct, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held:
Officer Beebe's negligent act in the instant case is the type which poses the possi-
bility of section 1983 liability. Holding a cocked pistol on a suspect evinces reck-
less disregard for the rights of the suspect, which would allow a jury to find a
constitutional violation and section 1983 liability. Such an act greatly increases
the likelihood that the law enforcement officer will serve as the suspect's judge,
jury, and executioner before his guilt is determined by a court of law. Although
Beebe did not intend to injure Larry Wilson, holding a cocked pistol on him so
increased the likelihood that injury would occur that Wilson's due process right
to be free from use of excessive police force could have been violated.
Id. at 350.
But see Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976) This is a pre-Parratt
decision which held that gross negligence must be shown for all substantive due process
violations made actionable under section 1983.
176. See supra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
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Once it is decided that negligent conduct could indeed rise
to the level of a substantive due process violation, then the
next question to ask is whether the negligent conduct is ac-
tionable under section 1983. Thus, this Comment proposes
that if negligent conduct rises to the level of a substantive due
process violation and, thus a constitutional violation, it
should be actionable under section 1983. The Parratt analysis
which would relegate the claim to a state tort remedy should
not be applied. A number of reasons support this view.
First, if the negligent deprivation of a liberty interest rises
to the level of a substantive due process violation, it becomes a
constitutional violation. The existence or non-existence of
state post-deprivation remedies has no bearing on whether the
plaintiff has a constitutional claim. 177
Second, substantive due process embodies rights which
may not be taken away under any circumstances. 178  The
availability of a state tort remedy should not bar a section
1983 action to vindicate the violation of a constitutional
right.1 79
Third, if an official's conduct, including negligence, is so
egregious as to violate substantive due process, the civil rights
implication is so great that the federal courts should not be
precluded from hearing the case.18 0 By definition, a substan-
tive due process violation, even if negligently caused, raises
constitutional concerns that have to be addressed in federal
court.
Fourth, if some courts were to hold state tort remedies suf-
ficient in cases which involve a negligent deprivation of a lib-
erty interest that rises to the level of a substantive due process
violation, this would result in a preference of state remedies
over federal remedies. This would be true even if the plaintiff
has a prima facie section 1983 case.18 1
Fifth, the Court in Parratt addressed only procedural due
process, not substantive due process.18 2 The cases examined
177. Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1500.
178. Madden v. City of Meriden, 602 F. Supp. 1160, 1166-67 (D. Conn. 1985).
179. Id.
180. Schiller, 540 F. Supp. at 613-18.
181. Brewer, 692 F.2d at 394 n.10.
182. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 536; Holmes v. Wampler, 546 F. Supp. 500, 503-04
n.3 (E.D. Va. 1982) ("In Parratt, the Court distinguished between those claims involv-
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by the Court uniformly involved procedural due process.1 8 3
Substantive due process is not mentioned in Parratt, except in
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion wherein he intimates
that the Parratt analysis should only apply to procedural due
process. He stated:" 4
I also do not understand the Court to intimate that the sole
content of the Due Process Clause is procedural regularity.
I continue to believe that there are certain governmental ac-
tions that, even if undertaken with a full panoply of proce-
dural protection are, in and of themselves, antithetical to
fundamental notions of due process.' 85
Finally, by no stretch of the imagination did Parratt, which
involved a prisoner's hobby kit worth approximately twenty-
four dollars, constitute a deprivation which "shocked the con-
science" of the court to the extent necessary to satisfy the sub-
stantive due process standard. 186
Thus, in view of all of these reasons, the negligent depriva-
tion of a liberty interest which rises to the level of a substan-
tive due process violation should be actionable under section
1983. Although some courts believe it is hard to draw a line
between those deprivations that implicate substantive due pro-
cess rights and those that do not, 18 7 they should not be afraid
to make this distinction.
ing specific substantive constitutional guarantees, and those involving only 'the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment simpliciter.... [S]ubstantive due process
was conspicuous by its absence in Parratt."); see also Augustine, 740 F.2d at 327 ("Par-
ratt applies only when a plaintiff asserts a violation of his right to procedural due pro-
cess. Parratt is irrelevant if the plaintiff alleges a violation of a substantive right
protected by the Constitution."); Daniels, 720 F.2d at 796 n.3; Wolf-Lilie, 699 F.2d at
872 ("Parratt is thus not applicable to instances where the substantive guarantees of the
Constitution are alleged to be violated, as opposed to alleged violations of procedural
due process."); Duncan, 657 F.2d at 704; Bullard, 592 F. Supp. at 778; Elam, 573 F.
Supp. at 803; Begg, 555 F. Supp. at 1354; Irshad, 543 F. Supp. at 926; Schiller, 540 F.
Supp. at 613-14; Howse, 537 F. Supp. at 1180.
183. Bullard, 592 F. Supp. at 779.
184. Id.; see also Parratt, 451 U.S. at 545.
185. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 545; see also Bullard, 592 F. Supp at 779.
186. Holmes, 546 F. Supp. at 505.
187. Bullard, 592 F. Supp. at 776; see also Madden, 602 F. Supp. at 1167.
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C. Negligent Deprivation of a Liberty Interest Which Does
Not Rise to the Level of a Substantive
Due Process Violation
A deprivation which does not rise to the level of a substan-
tive due process violation implicates procedural due process.
As previously mentioned, Daniels and Davidson held that neg-
ligent conduct by a state official does not violate the due pro-
cess clause. Because of the specific claims involved, both cases
involved procedural due process. 18 8 Although the harm impli-
cated a liberty interest, both claimants attacked the validity of
the procedures provided for prisoners who seek a remedy for
physical injury caused by the negligence of prison officials. 189
This Comment agrees with the Daniels and Davidson opin-
ions to the limited extent that negligence should not be action-
able under section 1983 for procedural due process claims.
However, prior to Daniels and Davidson some lower courts,
using the Parratt analysis, precluded from section 1983 ac-
tionability both negligent1 90 and intentional1 91 deprivations of
liberty which involved a non-substantive due process viola-
tion. These lower courts went further than Daniels and Da-
vidson in limiting the scope of section 1983.
This Comment proposes that to be actionable under sec-
tion 1983, a deprivation of a liberty interest which does not
rise to the level of a substantive due process violation must, at
a minimum, result from gross negligence.1 92 This obviously
means that an intentional deprivation of a liberty interest
which does not rise to the level of a substantive due process
violation would be actionable under section 1983. Since the
focus of this Comment is only on the minimum culpability
requirement, only gross negligence will be discussed.
This Comment's rationale for gross negligence being the
minimum level of culpability for a non-substantive due pro-
cess violation is that the Supreme Court has on a number of
occasions expressed concern that section 1983 will become a
188. See supra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
189. See Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 679-80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
190. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Barnier, 565 F. Supp. at 878.
192. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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"font of tort law,"' 193 and that both section 1983194 and the due
process clause will become trivialized. 195 There must be a lim-
itation on the actionability of a negligent deprivation of a lib-
erty interest that does not rise to the level of a substantive due
process violation. If negligence were the minimum standard
of culpability required for non-substantive due process viola-
tions, section 1983 would become very expansive. If one ex-
amines particular fact situations, the necessity of this
limitation becomes apparent.
For example, a police officer on patrol in a squad car acts
negligently and causes an accident with another driver. As a
result of the accident, the other driver is injured. If an expan-
sive reading of section 1983 were allowed, the driver would be
deprived without procedural due process of a liberty interest
to be free from harm by a police officer. Thus, if negligence
were actionable under section 1983 for non-substantive due
process violations, the negligent police officer would arguably
be liable under section 1983.
Further, if negligent action could result in a procedural
due process violation, then a slip-and-fall situation could also
be actionable under section 1983. This is exactly the type of
situation that concerned the Supreme Court in Parratt, Dan-
iels and Davidson. The Court was fearful that section 1983
would be used to hold state actors liable for car accidents. 196
193. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701; Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544.
194. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 89, particularly the dissent by Judge Keith in Wilson 1M, 770
F.2d at 593.
196. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544.
To accept respondent's argument that the conduct of the state officials in this
case constituted a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment would almost neces-
sarily result in turning every alleged injury which may have been inflicted by a
state official acting under 'color of law' into a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment cognizable under § 1983. It is hard to perceive any logical stopping
place to such a line of reasoning. Presumably, under this rationale any party
who is involved in nothing more than an automobile accident with a state official
could allege a constitutional violation under § 1983. Such reasoning 'would
make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon
whatever systems may already be administered by the States.' Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 701 (1976). We do not think that the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended the Amendment to play such a role in our society.
See also Friedman, supra note 59, at 563-64; supra note 53.
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This is a valid concern because simple car accidents do not
rise to the level of constitutional violations.' 97
One must be sensitive, however, to other possible scena-
rios. For example, consider the situation in which a police
officer recklessly handles a weapon and it discharges, striking
a person in the foot. This act definitely deprives the individual
of the liberty interest to be free from bodily harm, although it
would probably not "shock the conscience" of the court. This
would not be a substantive due process violation. Further,
under the Parratt analysis, pre-deprivation due process would
be impractical, if not impossible, under such circumstances.
The injured plaintiff described above would only have a tort
remedy in the state court system, but should also have a rem-
edy under section 1983. In other words, the Parratt analysis
should not apply to grossly negligent or intentional depriva-
tions of liberty which do not rise to the level of a substantive
due process violation. A number of reasons support this
proposition.
First, the deprivation of a liberty interest which does not
rise to the level of a substantive due process violation, but
which results from the grossly negligent conduct of an official,
deserves federal protection. The liberty interest to be free
from bodily harm is a jealously protected interest. 98 It is not
like a property interest which can be replaced without any sig-
nificant harm to the individual. Once someone has been de-
prived of a liberty interest, it cannot be replaced; 99 the victim
can only be compensated. The fact remains that a person's
liberty was infringed. 200 However, due to the Court's deci-
sions in Daniels and Davidson, a negligently deprived liberty
interest which is a non-substantive due process violation is not
actionable under section 1983. In contrast, a liberty interest
deprived by conduct which is grossly negligent and which is a
197. Friedman, supra note 59, at 564; see supra note 53.
198. See supra note 3.
199. See, e.g., Haygood v. Younger, 527 F. Supp. 808, 814 (E.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd,
718 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1982).
200. Id.; see also Note, Defining the Parameters of Section 1983: Parratt v. Taylor,
23 B.C.L. REv. 1219, 1246 (1982).
[Vol. 69:599
1986] LIBERTY DEPRIVATIONS AND SECTION 1983 641
non-substantive due process violation should be actionable
under section 1983.201
Second, if this Comment's proposal regarding substantive
due process is accepted, an inherent unfairness would exist be-
tween the outcome in two situations. For example, if an offi-
cial's negligent conduct is such that it "shocks the conscience"
of the court and therefore is a substantive due process viola-
tion, then the injured party would be able to bring an action
under section 1983.202 However, where an official's conduct
amounts to gross negligence, but does not rise to the level of a
substantive due process violation, then there is the potential
that it would not be actionable under section 1983. Notice
that even though a higher level of culpability is involved, it is
not actionable under section 1983 because it does not rise to a
certain level of conscience-shocking. This is plainly not fair.
In both cases the plaintiff has been injured and has suffered
pain in addition to other damages. In the first case, the plain-
tiff would be allowed to seek redress in federal court under
section 1983, while in the second case, the plaintiff may be
barred from the federal court system and forced to seek a rem-
edy in state court, despite having suffered a deprivation of lib-
erty as a result of higher culpability by a state official.
To further understand why the Parratt analysis should not
be applied to a grossly negligent deprivation of a liberty inter-
est for a non-substantive due process violation, one must ex-
amine the policy reasons behind section 1983. Primarily, one
must realize the importance of the federal court as the arbiter
for the resolution of issues which encompass constitutional
dimensions. °3 As with substantive due process violations, the
federal courts are the guardians of an individual's civil rights,
and they are to be interposed between the state and the indi-
vidual.2 4 If the Parratt analysis is to prevail, unchecked in the
201. It should be noted that in Daniels the Court did not decide whether gross
negligence or recklessness could implicate the protections of the due process clause.
"Accordingly, this case affords us no occasion to consider whether something less than
intentional conduct, such as recklessness or 'gross negligence,' is enough to trigger the
protections of the Due Process Clause." 106 S. Ct. at 667 n.3.
202. See supra notes 164-87 and accompanying text.
203. Brief for the Amicus Curiae A.C.L.U. Fund of Michigan at 29, Barnier v.
Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869, 878 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (brief also submitted for Wilson
v. Beebe, 743 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1984)); see generally Note, supra note 31, at 1140.
204. A.C.L.U. Brief, supra note 203, at 29-30.
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procedural due process realm, then all questions of procedural
due process - including questions concerning liberty interests
deprived through gross negligence which do not rise to sub-
stantive due process violations - are relegated to the state
court system. 5 This phenomenon will destroy the search for
consistent resolution of constitutional questions.20 6
The second policy concern of section 1983 involves the
symbolic importance of the federal court remedy.207 The
function of section 1983, which allows the plaintiff to pursue
an action in federal court, is for the most part symbolic. 20 8
The role of the federal courts is to form a barrier between
aggrieved plaintiffs and the state officials who have harmed
them.20 9 There is no better forum than the neutral atmos-
phere of the federal courts in which to assure that an individ-
ual's constitutional rights are not deprived by offending state
actions.210 Furthermore, the neutral forum of the federal
court is preferable to a forum where a state judge reviews the
actions of another state official. 11
CONCLUSION
This Comment has proposed that where an official's negli-
gent conduct deprives a person of a liberty interest which rises
to the level of a substantive due process violation, a constitu-
tional violation has resulted which should be actionable under
section 1983. When an official deprives a person of a liberty
interest that does not rise to the level of a substantive due pro-
cess violation, but the officer's conduct is found to be at least
grossly negligent, then there should likewise be a cause of ac-
tion under section 1983. This limitation on the deprivation of
a liberty interest which does not rise to a substantive due pro-
cess violation precludes from actionability those actions, such
as car accidents, which would turn section 1983 into "a font
of tort law."
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. A.C.L.U. Brief, supra note 203, at 37.
208. Whitman, supra note 51, at 24.
209. A.C.L.U. Brief, supra note 203, at 37.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 36.
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The use of the gross negligence standard for the depriva-
tion of a liberty interest that is a non-substantive due process
violation is just and fair. Furthermore, the gross negligence
standard maintains the harmony between the concern of trivi-
alizing the federal courts212 and the policy concerns of section
1983.
THADD J. LLAURADO
212. Whitman, supra note 51, at 26-30.
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